SITREP: Afghanistan – the Long Haul

One thing I can say about George W. Bush, rarely did he set blame on ongoing problems of the previous administration, although several times he could have honestly done so. He was too busy with matters at hand and in the final

The why don’t we just move on Clintonista crowd of yesterday whenever a valid point was brought up about something concerning Slick Willy; and now nothing concerning the constant referral to GW Bush by Barack Obama on how he did this and GW Bush did that whenever complaints about how the Obama and his administration (and associates in Congress) handle situations – often the same way they complained about when GW Bush was president.

√ Charles Krauthammer wrote about this in an article entitled The Three Envelopes, which is circulating about the chain email with no recognition of where it came from – tacky.

Charles writes:

It’s as if Obama’s presidency hasn’t really started. He’s still taking inventory of the Bush years. Just this Monday, he referred to “long years of drift” in Afghanistan in order to, I suppose, explain away his own, well, yearlong drift on Afghanistan. This compulsion to attack his predecessor is as stale as it is unseemly. Obama was elected a year ago. He became commander in chief two months later. He then solemnly announced his own “comprehensive new strategy” for Afghanistan seven months ago. …
Obama is obviously unhappy with the path he himself chose in March. Fine. He has every right — indeed, duty — to reconsider. But what Obama is reacting to is the failure of his own strategy. There is nothing new here. The history of both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars is a considered readjustment of policies that have failed. In each war, quick initial low-casualty campaigns toppled enemy governments. In the subsequent occupation stage, two policy choices presented themselves: the light or heavy “footprint.” In both Iraq and Afghanistan, we initially chose the light footprint. …
This was the considered judgment of our commanders at the time, most especially Centcom commander (2003-2007) Gen. John Abizaid. And Abizaid was no stranger to the territory. He speaks Arabic and is a scholar of the region. The overriding idea was that the light footprint would minimize local opposition.
It was a perfectly reasonable assumption, but it proved wrong. The strategy failed. Not just because the enemy proved highly resilient but because the allegiance of the population turned out to hinge far less on resentment of foreign intrusiveness (in fact the locals came to hate the insurgents — al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Taliban in Afghanistan — far more than us) than on physical insecurity, which made them side with the insurgents out of sheer fear. What they needed, argued Gen. David Petraeus against much Pentagon brass opposition, was population protection, i.e., a heavy footprint. …
That’s where we are now in Afghanistan. The logic of a true counterinsurgency strategy there is that whatever resentment a troop surge might occasion pales in comparison with the continued demoralization of any potential anti-Taliban elements unless they receive serious and immediate protection from U.S.-NATO forces. n other words, Obama is facing the same decision on Afghanistan that Bush faced in late 2006 in deciding to surge in Iraq. …
Which is evidently what Obama now thinks of the policy choice he made on March 27. He is to be commended for reconsidering. But it is time he acted like a president and decided. Afghanistan is his. He’s used up his envelopes.

√ President Obama, Time to Make a Decision by Chuck Norris:

In May, President Barack Obama removed Gen. David D. McKiernan as the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan and replaced him with Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal — who, in September, issued a dire report warning that without as many as 40,000 more troops for the fight in Afghanistan, the mission “will likely result in failure.” …
Roughly a month after McChrystal’s requests, White House chief of staff Rahm Emanuel continued to blame the Bush administration for the chaos in the war. White House press secretary Robert Gibbs blamed former Vice President Dick Cheney. Vice President Joe Biden blamed the generals for a bad military plan. And presidential adviser David Axelrod blamed Fox News. … Last Friday, the president met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and discussed the Afghanistan-Pakistan situation some more and then said he wants another meeting. …
I even read recently about Marine Lt. Col. Jeffrey Chessani — who, for more than 20 years, has served his country honorably. He has done three tours in Iraq and also served in Panama and the Gulf War. Despite his commendable service, however, on Dec. 1, Lt. Col. Chessani will face a military board of inquiry to determine whether he is guilty of misconduct and should be demoted because of the “Haditha massacre” — an event now known never to have occurred. You can read more about his military tribunal and donate to his case at the Thomas More Law Center’s Web site (http://www.ThomasMore.org).
Whether it’s donating to Lt. Col. Chessani’s case, starting a campaign against the delays in Washington or preparing Christmas care packages for our troops, I want to encourage all Americans to find a way this holiday season to support our service members, particularly those in the Middle East. …
As a family member who has experienced the military sacrifice of a loved one (my brother Wieland in Vietnam in 1970) and as a veteran of the Air Force who was based in Korea, I, like many of you, understand the costs of fighting for freedom. So let’s join together in extending a simple thank you, a letter or an outstretched hand of gratitude to our service members and their families.

√ Afghanistan: No Exit by Ed Corcoran …

What we need in Afghanistan is not an exit, but a transformation. It has become a key area in the long war – actually not a war, but part of the never ending struggle for human development. Talking of exit is a throwback to the XIX Century when the United States was protected in isolation by two great oceans. This was before the events of the XX Century thrust the nation into the role of global leadership. And it was before the globalization of the XXI Century integrated the world community into a web of mutual dependence. It is possible to physically withdraw from Afghanistan, but we cannot withdraw from the struggle for human development. … It is the decade’s long struggle with totalitarian communism, now continuing in the ongoing struggle against autocracy and repression and for good governance and development. Afghanistan represents both the necessity and the opportunity to reinvigorate US relations with the Muslim world. In the short term, the struggle is denying al Qaeda and radical jihadists a base of operations against the West. … The challenge of radical Islam is indeed global. Afghanistan is not the only field of engagement. …
The United States and NATO have to be seen as committed for the long term, determined to strengthening the economic, social and political situation of its Afghan partners. Determined most of all to demonstrate that radical Islamist concepts are deeply flawed, that the West does indeed support the development of vibrant Muslim societies and seeks to integrate them into a prosperous global system. That is the fundamental objective of our struggles in Afghanistan. We must disabuse the Taliban of any misconceptions that we will soon leave the country to them. … US resolve can significantly assist other efforts to address radical Islamic groups, particularly in neighboring Pakistan where a concerted campaign against the Taliban in Waziristan is currently under way.